The staggering pace with which the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) are increasing, as measured by a range of commonly used natural language understanding (NLU) benchmarks, raises many questions regarding what “understanding” means for a language model and how it compares to human understanding. This is especially true since many LLMs are exclusively trained on text, casting doubt on whether their stellar benchmark performances are reflective of a true understanding of the problems represented by these benchmarks, or whether LLMs simply excel at uttering textual forms that correlate with what someone who understands the problem would say. In this philosophically inspired work, we aim to create some separation between form and meaning, with a series of tests that leverage the idea that world understanding should be consistent across presentational modes—inspired by Fregean senses —of the same meaning. Specifically, we focus on consistency across languages as well as paraphrases. Taking GPT-3.5 as our object of study, we evaluate multisense consistency across five different languages and various tasks. We start the evaluation in a controlled setting, asking the model for simple facts, and then proceed with an evaluation on four popular NLU benchmarks. We find that the model’s multisense consistency is lacking and run several follow-up analyses to verify that this lack of consistency is due to a sense-dependent task understanding. We conclude that, in this aspect, the understanding of LLMs is still quite far from being consistent and human-like, and deliberate on how this impacts their utility in the context of learning about human language and understanding.