Understanding the neural processes that maintain goal-directed behavior is a major challenge for the study of attentional control. Although much of the previous work on the issue has focused on prefrontal brain areas, little is known about the contribution of sensory brain processes to the regulation of attentional control. The present EEG study examined brain oscillatory activities invoked in the processing of response conflict in a lateralized Eriksen single-flanker task, in which target letters were presented at fixation and single distractor letters were presented either left or right to the targets. Distractors were response compatible, response incompatible, or neutral in relation to the responses associated with the targets. The behavioral results showed that responses to targets in incompatible trials were slower and more error prone than responses in compatible trials. The electrophysiological results revealed an early sensory lateralization effect in (both evoked and induced) theta power (3–6 Hz) that was more pronounced in incompatible than compatible trials. The sensory lateralization effect preceded in time a midfrontal conflict effect that was indexed by an increase of (induced) theta power (6–9 Hz) in incompatible compared with compatible trials. The findings indicate an early modulation of sensory distractor processing induced by response conflict. Theoretical implications of the findings, in particular with respect to the theory of event coding and theories relating to stimulus–response binding [Henson, R. N., Eckstein, D., Waszak, F., Frings, C., & Horner, A. Stimulus-response bindings in priming. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 18, 376–384, 2014; Hommel, B., Müsseler, J., Aschersleben, G., & Prinz, W. The theory of event coding (TEC): A framework for perception and action planning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 849–878, 2001], are discussed.

We report here an unexpectedly robust ability of healthy human individuals ( n = 40) to recognize extremely distorted needle-like facial images, challenging the well-entrenched notion that veridical spatial configuration is necessary for extracting facial identity. In face identification tasks of parametrically compressed internal and external features, we found that the sum of performances on each cue falls significantly short of performance on full faces, despite the equal visual information available from both measures (with full faces essentially being a superposition of internal and external features). We hypothesize that this large deficit stems from the use of positional information about how the internal features are positioned relative to the external features. To test this, we systematically changed the relations between internal and external features and found preferential encoding of vertical but not horizontal spatial relationships in facial representations ( n = 20). Finally, we employ magnetoencephalography imaging ( n = 20) to demonstrate a close mapping between the behavioral psychometric curve and the amplitude of the M250 face familiarity, but not M170 face-sensitive evoked response field component, providing evidence that the M250 can be modulated by faces that are perceptually identifiable, irrespective of extreme distortions to the face's veridical configuration. We theorize that the tolerance to compressive distortions has evolved from the need to recognize faces across varying viewpoints. Our findings help clarify the important, but poorly defined, concept of facial configuration and also enable an association between behavioral performance and previously reported neural correlates of face perception.

Cognitive theories suggest that working memory maintains not only the identity of recently presented stimuli but also a sense of the elapsed time since the stimuli were presented. Previous studies of the neural underpinnings of working memory have focused on sustained firing, which can account for maintenance of the stimulus identity, but not for representation of the elapsed time. We analyzed single-unit recordings from the lateral prefrontal cortex of macaque monkeys during performance of a delayed match-to-category task. Each sample stimulus triggered a consistent sequence of neurons, with each neuron in the sequence firing during a circumscribed period. These sequences of neurons encoded both stimulus identity and elapsed time. The encoding of elapsed time became less precise as the sample stimulus receded into the past. These findings suggest that working memory includes a compressed timeline of what happened when, consistent with long-standing cognitive theories of human memory.

Visual object expertise correlates with neural selectivity in the fusiform face area (FFA). Although behavioral studies suggest that visual expertise is associated with increased use of holistic and configural information, little is known about the nature of the supporting neural representations. Using high-resolution 7-T functional magnetic resonance imaging, we recorded the multivoxel activation patterns elicited by whole cars, configurally disrupted cars, and car parts in individuals with a wide range of car expertise. A probabilistic support vector machine classifier was trained to differentiate activation patterns elicited by whole car images from activation patterns elicited by misconfigured car images. The classifier was then used to classify new combined activation patterns that were created by averaging activation patterns elicited by individually presented top and bottom car parts. In line with the idea that the configuration of parts is critical to expert visual perception, car expertise was negatively associated with the probability of a combined activation pattern being classified as a whole car in the right anterior FFA, a region critical to vision for categories of expertise. Thus, just as found for faces in normal observers, the neural representation of cars in right anterior FFA is more holistic for car experts than car novices, consistent with common mechanisms of neural selectivity for faces and other objects of expertise in this area.

An evolving view in cognitive neuroscience is that the dorsal visual pathway not only plays a key role in visuomotor behavior but that it also contributes functionally to the recognition of objects. To characterize the nature of the object representations derived by the dorsal pathway, we assessed perceptual performance in the context of the continuous flash suppression paradigm, which suppresses object processing in the ventral pathway while sparing computation in the dorsal pathway. In a series of experiments, prime stimuli, which were rendered imperceptible by the continuous flash suppression, still contributed to perceptual decisions related to the subsequent perceptible target stimuli. However, the contribution of the prime to perception was contingent on the prime's structural coherence, in that a perceptual advantage was observed only for targets primed by objects with legitimate 3-D structure. Finally, we obtained additional evidence to demonstrate that the processing of the suppressed objects was contingent on the magnocellular, rather than the parvocellular, system, further linking the processing of the suppressed stimuli to the dorsal pathway. Together, these results provide novel evidence that the dorsal pathway does not only support visuomotor control but, rather, that it also derives the structural description of 3-D objects and contributes to shape perception.

Performance on heuristics and bias tasks has been shown to be susceptible to bias. In turn, susceptibility to bias varies as a function of individual differences in cognitive abilities (e.g., intelligence) and thinking styles (e.g., propensity for reflection). Using a classic task (i.e., lawyer–engineer problem), we conducted two experiments to examine the differential contributions of cognitive abilities versus thinking styles to performance. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)—a well-established measure of reflective thinking—predicted performance on conflict problems (where base rates and intuition point in opposite directions), whereas STM predicted performance on nonconflict problems. Experiment 2 conducted in the fMRI scanner replicated this behavioral dissociation and enabled us to probe their neural correlates. As predicted, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the ACC—a key region for conflict detection—even in cases when participants responded stereotypically. In participants with higher CRT scores, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and activation in PCC covaried in relation to CRT scores during conflict problems. Also, CRT scores predicted activation in PCC in conflict problems (over and above nonconflict problems). Our results suggest that individual differences in reflective thinking as measured by CRT are related to brain activation in PCC—a region involved in regulating attention between external and internal foci. We discuss the implications of our findings in terms of PCC's possible involvement in switching from intuitive to analytic mode of thought.

Perception of faces has been shown to engage a domain-specific set of brain regions, including the occipital face area (OFA) and the fusiform face area (FFA). It is commonly held that the OFA is responsible for the detection of faces in the environment, whereas the FFA is responsible for processing the identity of the face. However, an alternative model posits that the FFA is responsible for face detection and subsequently recruits the OFA to analyze the face parts in the service of identification. An essential prediction of the former model is that the OFA is not sensitive to the arrangement of internal face parts. In the current fMRI study, we test the sensitivity of the OFA and FFA to the configuration of face parts. Participants were shown faces in which the internal parts were presented in a typical configuration (two eyes above a nose above a mouth) or in an atypical configuration (the locations of individual parts were shuffled within the face outline). Perception of the atypical faces evoked a significantly larger response than typical faces in the OFA and in a wide swath of the surrounding posterior occipitotemporal cortices. Surprisingly, typical faces did not evoke a significantly larger response than atypical faces anywhere in the brain, including the FFA (although some subthreshold differences were observed). We propose that face processing in the FFA results in inhibitory sculpting of activation in the OFA, which accounts for this region's weaker response to typical than to atypical configurations.

Researchers have proposed that solving complex reasoning problems, a key indicator of fluid intelligence, involves the same cognitive processes as solving working memory tasks. This proposal is supported by an overlap of the functional brain activations associated with the two types of tasks and by high correlations between interindividual differences in performance. We replicated these findings in 53 older participants but also showed that solving reasoning and working memory problems benefits from different configurations of the functional connectome and that this dissimilarity increases with a higher difficulty load. Specifically, superior performance in a typical working memory paradigm ( n -back) was associated with upregulation of modularity (increased between-network segregation), whereas performance in the reasoning task was associated with effective downregulation of modularity. We also showed that working memory training promotes task-invariant increases in modularity. Because superior reasoning performance is associated with downregulation of modular dynamics, training may thus have fostered an inefficient way of solving the reasoning tasks. This could help explain why working memory training does little to promote complex reasoning performance. The study concludes that complex reasoning abilities cannot be reduced to working memory and suggests the need to reconsider the feasibility of using working memory training interventions to attempt to achieve effects that transfer to broader cognition.

How do we understand the emotional content of written words? Here, we investigate the hypothesis that written words that carry emotions are processed through phylogenetically ancient neural circuits that are involved in the processing of the very same emotions in nonlanguage contexts. This hypothesis was tested with respect to disgust. In an fMRI experiment, it was found that the same region of the left anterior insula responded whether people observed facial expressions of disgust or whether they read words with disgusting content. In a follow-up experiment, it was found that repetitive TMS over the left insula in comparison with a control site interfered with the processing of disgust words to a greater extent than with the processing of neutral words. Together, the results support the hypothesis that the affective processes we experience when reading rely on the reuse of phylogenetically ancient brain structures that process basic emotions in other domains and species.

Numerical format describes the way magnitude is conveyed, for example, as a digit (“3”) or Roman numeral (“III”). In the field of numerical cognition, there is an ongoing debate of whether magnitude representation is independent of numerical format. Here, we examine the time course of magnitude processing when using different symbolic formats. We presented participants with a series of digits and dice patterns corresponding to the magnitudes of 1 to 6 while performing a 1-back task on magnitude. Magnetoencephalography offers an opportunity to record brain activity with high temporal resolution. Multivariate pattern analysis applied to magnetoencephalographic data allows us to draw conclusions about brain activation patterns underlying information processing over time. The results show that we can cross-decode magnitude when training the classifier on magnitude presented in one symbolic format and testing the classifier on the other symbolic format. This suggests a similar representation of these numerical symbols. In addition, results from a time generalization analysis show that digits were accessed slightly earlier than dice, demonstrating temporal asynchronies in their shared representation of magnitude. Together, our methods allow a distinction between format-specific signals and format-independent representations of magnitude showing evidence that there is a shared representation of magnitude accessed via different symbols.

Prestimulus subsequent memory effects (preSMEs)—differences in neural activity elicited by a task cue at encoding that are predictive of later memory performance—are thought to reflect differential engagement of preparatory processes that benefit episodic memory encoding. We investigated age differences in preSMEs indexed by differences in ERP amplitude just before the onset of a study item. Young and older adults incidentally encoded words for a subsequent memory test. Each study word was preceded by a task cue that signaled a judgment to perform on the word. Words were presented for either a short (300 msec) or long (1000 msec) duration with the aim of placing differential benefits on engaging preparatory processes initiated by the task cue. ERPs associated with subsequent successful and unsuccessful recollection, operationalized here by source memory accuracy, were estimated time-locked to the onset of the task cue. In a late time window (1000–2000 msec after onset of the cue), young adults demonstrated frontally distributed preSMEs for both the short and long study durations, albeit with opposite polarities in the two conditions. This finding suggests that preSMEs in young adults are sensitive to perceived task demands. Although older adults showed no evidence of preSMEs in the same late time window, significant preSMEs were observed in an earlier time window (500–1000 msec) that was invariant with study duration. These results are broadly consistent with the proposal that older adults differ from their younger counterparts in how they engage preparatory processes during memory encoding.

Knowing whether core reward regions carry information about the positions of relevant objects is crucial for adjudicating between choice models. One limitation of previous studies, including our own, is that spatial positions can be consistently differentially associated with rewards, and thus position can be confounded with attention, motor plans, or target identity. We circumvented these problems by using a task in which value—and thus choices—was determined solely by a frequently changing rule, which was randomized relative to spatial position on each trial. We presented offers asynchronously, which allowed us to control for reward expectation, spatial attention, and motor plans in our analyses. We find robust encoding of the spatial position of both offers and choices in two core reward regions, orbitofrontal Area 13 and ventral striatum, as well as in dorsal striatum of macaques. The trial-by-trial correlation in noise in encoding of position was associated with variation in choice, an effect known as choice probability correlation, suggesting that the spatial encoding is associated with choice and is not incidental to it. Spatial information and reward information are not carried by separate sets of neurons, although the two forms of information are temporally dissociable. These results highlight the ubiquity of multiplexed information in association cortex and argue against the idea that these ostensible reward regions serve as part of a pure value domain.

Humans show an involuntary tendency to copy other people's actions. Although automatic imitation builds rapport and affiliation between individuals, we do not copy actions indiscriminately. Instead, copying behaviors are guided by a selection mechanism, which inhibits some actions and prioritizes others. To date, the neural underpinnings of the inhibition of automatic imitation and differences between the sexes in imitation control are not well understood. Previous studies involved small sample sizes and low statistical power, which produced mixed findings regarding the involvement of domain-general and domain-specific neural architectures. Here, we used data from Experiment 1 ( N = 28) to perform a power analysis to determine the sample size required for Experiment 2 ( N = 50; 80% power). Using independent functional localizers and an analysis pipeline that bolsters sensitivity, during imitation control we show clear engagement of the multiple-demand network (domain-general), but no sensitivity in the theory-of-mind network (domain-specific). Weaker effects were observed with regard to sex differences, suggesting that there are more similarities than differences between the sexes in terms of the neural systems engaged during imitation control. In summary, neurocognitive models of imitation require revision to reflect that the inhibition of imitation relies to a greater extent on a domain-general selection system rather than a domain-specific system that supports social cognition.

Visual attention allows the allocation of limited neural processing resources to stimuli based on their behavioral priorities. The selection of task-relevant visual targets entails the processing of multiple competing stimuli and the suppression of distractors that may be either perceptually salient or perceptually similar to targets. The posterior parietal cortex controls the interaction between top–down (task-driven) and bottom–up (stimulus-driven) processes competing for attentional selection, as well as spatial distribution of attention. Here, we examined whether biparietal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) would modulate the interaction between top–down and bottom–up processes in visual attention. Visual attention function was assessed with a visual discrimination task, in which a lateralized target was presented alone or together with a contralateral, similar or salient, distractor. The accuracy and RTs were measured before and during three stimulation sessions (sham, right anodal/left cathodal, left anodal/right cathodal). The analyses demonstrated (i) polarity-dependent effects of tDCS on the accuracy of target discrimination, but only when the target was presented with a similar distractor; (ii) the tDCS-triggered effects on the accuracy of discriminating targets, accompanied by a similar distractor, varied according to the target location; and (iii) overall detrimental effects of tDCS on RTs were observed, regardless of target location, distractor type, and polarity of the stimulation. We conclude that the observed polarity, distractor type, and target location-dependent effects of biparietal tDCS on the accuracy of target detection resulted from both a modulation of the interaction between top–down and bottom–up attentional processes and the interhemispheric competition mechanisms guiding attentional selection and spatial deployment of attention.

Previous findings have suggested that auditory attention causes not only enhancement in neural processing gain, but also sharpening in neural frequency tuning in human auditory cortex. The current study was aimed to reexamine these findings. Specifically, we aimed to investigate whether attentional gain enhancement and frequency sharpening emerge at the same or different processing levels and whether they represent independent or cooperative effects. For that, we examined the pattern of attentional modulation effects on early, sensory-driven cortical auditory-evoked potentials occurring at different latencies. Attention was manipulated using a dichotic listening task and was thus not selectively directed to specific frequency values. Possible attention-related changes in frequency tuning selectivity were measured with an adaptation paradigm. Our results show marked disparities in attention effects between the earlier N1 deflection and the subsequent P2 deflection, with the N1 showing a strong gain enhancement effect, but no sharpening, and the P2 showing clear evidence of sharpening, but no independent gain effect. They suggest that gain enhancement and frequency sharpening represent successive stages of a cooperative attentional modulation mechanism that increases the representational bandwidth of attended versus unattended sounds.

The neural underpinnings of perceptual awareness have been extensively studied using unisensory (e.g., visual alone) stimuli. However, perception is generally multisensory, and it is unclear whether the neural architecture uncovered in these studies directly translates to the multisensory domain. Here, we use EEG to examine brain responses associated with the processing of visual, auditory, and audiovisual stimuli presented near threshold levels of detectability, with the aim of deciphering similarities and differences in the neural signals indexing the transition into perceptual awareness across vision, audition, and combined visual–auditory (multisensory) processing. More specifically, we examine (1) the presence of late evoked potentials (∼>300 msec), (2) the across-trial reproducibility, and (3) the evoked complexity associated with perceived versus nonperceived stimuli. Results reveal that, although perceived stimuli are associated with the presence of late evoked potentials across each of the examined sensory modalities, between-trial variability and EEG complexity differed for unisensory versus multisensory conditions. Whereas across-trial variability and complexity differed for perceived versus nonperceived stimuli in the visual and auditory conditions, this was not the case for the multisensory condition. Taken together, these results suggest that there are fundamental differences in the neural correlates of perceptual awareness for unisensory versus multisensory stimuli. Specifically, the work argues that the presence of late evoked potentials, as opposed to neural reproducibility or complexity, most closely tracks perceptual awareness regardless of the nature of the sensory stimulus. In addition, the current findings suggest a greater similarity between the neural correlates of perceptual awareness of unisensory (visual and auditory) stimuli when compared with multisensory stimuli.

Adapting behavior based on category knowledge is a fundamental cognitive function, which can be achieved via different learning strategies relying on different systems in the brain. Whereas the learning of typical category members has been linked to implicit, prototype abstraction learning, which relies predominantly on prefrontal areas, the learning of exceptions is associated with explicit, exemplar-based learning, which has been linked to the hippocampus. Stress is known to foster implicit learning strategies at the expense of explicit learning. Procedural, prefrontal learning and cognitive control processes are reflected in frontal midline theta (4–8 Hz) oscillations during feedback processing. In the current study, we examined the effect of acute stress on feedback-based category learning of typical category members and exceptions and the oscillatory correlates of feedback processing in the EEG. A computational modeling procedure was applied to estimate the use of abstraction and exemplar strategies during category learning. We tested healthy, male participants who underwent either the socially evaluated cold pressor test or a nonstressful control procedure before they learned to categorize typical members and exceptions based on feedback. The groups did not differ significantly in their categorization accuracy or use of categorization strategies. In the EEG, however, stressed participants revealed elevated theta power specifically during the learning of exceptions, whereas the theta power during the learning of typical members did not differ between the groups. Elevated frontal theta power may reflect an increased involvement of medial prefrontal areas in the learning of exceptions under stress.

People often make approachability decisions based on perceived facial trustworthiness. However, it remains unclear how people learn trustworthiness from a population of faces and whether this learning influences their approachability decisions. Here we investigated the neural underpinning of approach behavior and tested two important hypotheses: whether the amygdala adapts to different trustworthiness ranges and whether the amygdala is modulated by task instructions and evaluative goals. We showed that participants adapted to the stimulus range of perceived trustworthiness when making approach decisions and that these decisions were further modulated by the social context. The right amygdala showed both linear response and quadratic response to trustworthiness level, as observed in prior studies. Notably, the amygdala's response to trustworthiness was not modulated by stimulus range or social context, a possible neural dynamic adaptation. Together, our data have revealed a robust behavioral adaptation to different trustworthiness ranges as well as a neural substrate underlying approach behavior based on perceived facial trustworthiness.

During a decision process, the evidence supporting alternative options is integrated over time, and the choice is made when the accumulated evidence for one of the options reaches a decision threshold. Humans and animals have an ability to control the decision threshold, that is, the amount of evidence that needs to be gathered to commit to a choice, and it has been proposed that the subthalamic nucleus (STN) is important for this control. Recent behavioral and neurophysiological data suggest that, in some circumstances, the decision threshold decreases with time during choice trials, allowing overcoming of indecision during difficult choices. Here we asked whether this within-trial decrease of the decision threshold is mediated by the STN and if it is affected by disrupting information processing in the STN through deep brain stimulation (DBS). We assessed 13 patients with Parkinson disease receiving bilateral STN DBS six or more months after the surgery, 11 age-matched controls, and 12 young healthy controls. All participants completed a series of decision trials, in which the evidence was presented in discrete time points, which allowed more direct estimation of the decision threshold. The participants differed widely in the slope of their decision threshold, ranging from constant threshold within a trial to steeply decreasing. However, the slope of the decision threshold did not depend on whether STN DBS was switched on or off and did not differ between the patients and controls. Furthermore, there was no difference in accuracy and RT between the patients in the on and off stimulation conditions and healthy controls. Previous studies that have reported modulation of the decision threshold by STN DBS or unilateral subthalamotomy in Parkinson disease have involved either fast decision-making under conflict or time pressure or in anticipation of high reward. Our findings suggest that, in the absence of reward, decision conflict, or time pressure for decision-making, the STN does not play a critical role in modulating the within-trial decrease of decision thresholds during the choice process.

Modulations in motor cortical beta and alpha activity have been implicated in the preparation, execution, and termination of voluntary movements. The functional role of motor cortex beta activity is yet to be defined, though two opposing theories prevail. The idling cortex theory suggests that large-scale motor networks, in the absence of input, revert to an intrinsic oscillatory state. The alternative theory proposes that beta activity promotes postural tone at the expense of voluntary movement. These theories are primarily based on observations of event-related desynchronization associated with movement onset. Here, we explore the changes in alpha and beta oscillatory activity associated with the specific behavioral patterns during an established directional uncertainty paradigm. We demonstrate that, consistent with current proposals, alpha and beta desynchronization reflects a process of disengagement from existing networks to enable the creation of functional assemblies. We demonstrate that, following desynchronization, a novel signature of transient alpha synchrony underlies the recruitment of functional assemblies required for directional control. Although alpha and beta desynchronization are dependent upon the number of cues presented, they are not predictive of movement preparation. However, the transient alpha synchrony occurs only when participants have sufficient information to prepare for movement and shows a direct relationship with behavioral performance measures.